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THE HORIZONS OF ANTITRUST
THE 2016 LEWIS BERNSTEIN MEMORIAL LECTURE
RICHARD M. STEUER†
Two economic issues that appeared front and center during
the 2016 United States presidential election campaign were jobs
and inequality.
Among the solutions being offered was
heightened antitrust enforcement. Some argued simply for more
enforcement, while others argued that the standard for applying
the antitrust laws itself needed to be changed.
The goals of antitrust law have been debated for as long as
these laws have been on the books, but now, with competition
laws in effect in over a hundred countries, that debate has gone
global and has assumed renewed urgency.1
Not only are there wildly different opinions within the
United States, but the goals pursued by other nations vary
widely, creating significant asymmetries that can advantage one
trading partner over another.
Until about forty years ago, there was considerable support
in the United States for an expansive view of antitrust goals, one
that included such objectives as the dispersion of economic and
political power. Since that time, most of these goals have been
eliminated from antitrust analysis in the United States, leaving
only the goal of fostering low prices, high quality, and high
output at low cost. This goal is commonly termed “consumer
welfare” or “total welfare,” since advocates of this standard
usually have defined it to encompass the combined economic
welfare of consumers and producers, regardless of how that
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“Competition law,” rather than “antitrust law,” is the term used almost
everywhere outside the United States.
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welfare is distributed between them.2 By either name, the goal is
greater efficiency, resulting in lower costs and prices for more
and better products or services.3
But there are other goals that are priorities in the world’s
economies, including not only full employment and altered
income distribution, and not only the dispersion of economic and
political power, but also national security, the preservation of
domestic control over critical resources, the survival of small
businesses, integration of disparate economic systems,
preservation of minority cultures, preservation of a diversity of
viewpoints, preservation of the environment, and others.
American antitrust jurisprudence once appeared inclined to
embrace a host of these objectives. In one of its first antitrust
opinions, the United States Supreme Court expressed particular
concern about anticompetitive practices “driving out of business
the small dealers and worthy men whose lives have been spent”
in commerce.4
In 1977, United States Federal Trade Commission Chairman
Michael Pertschuk went further and said that “no responsive
competition policy can neglect the social and environmental

2
See Fei Deng & Gregory K. Leonard, Allocative and Productive Efficiency, in 1
ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 449,
450 (Wayne Dale Collins et al. eds., 2008); ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST
PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 51 (1993). The United States Supreme
Court has cited consumer welfare as the goal of antitrust more than once, but it has
been noted that in none of these opinions has the Court indicated definitively what it
understood consumer welfare to mean. See Gregory J. Werden, Monopsony and the
Sherman Act: Consumer Welfare in a New Light, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 707, 721 (2007).
Judge Bork’s own conception of consumer welfare has been explained as
encompassing both consumer welfare and producer welfare. Steven C. Salop & R.
Craig Romaine, Preserving Monopoly: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards, and
Microsoft, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 617, 646 n.83 (1999); see also Renata Hesse,
Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at the 2016
Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium: And Never the Twain Shall Meet?
Connecting Popular and Professional Visions for Antitrust Enforcement (Sept. 20,
2016) (“[A]lthough we believe competition maximizes consumer welfare, the ultimate
standard by which we judge practices is their effect on competition, not on consumer
welfare” because sometimes there can be “a loss of important competition even if it is
difficult to measure its exact consumer impact.”).
3
See BORK, supra note 2, at 91 (Allocative efficiency and productive efficiency
“make up the overall efficiency that determines the level of our society’s wealth, or
consumer welfare.”).
4
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 323 (1897).
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harms . . . : resource depletion, energy waste, environmental
contamination, worker alienation, [and] the psychological and
social consequences of marketing-stimulated demands.”5
In 1979, Professor—and later FTC Chairman—Robert
Pitofsky published an influential article, The Political Content of
Antitrust,6 in which he wrote: “It is bad history, bad policy, and
bad law to exclude certain political values in interpreting the
antitrust laws.” By “political values,” he meant:
[F]irst, a fear that excessive concentration of economic power
will breed antidemocratic political pressures, and second, a
desire to enhance individual and business freedom by reducing
the range within which private discretion by a few in the
economic sphere controls the welfare of all. A third . . . concern
is that if the free-market sector of the economy is allowed to
develop under antitrust rules that are blind to all but economic
concerns, the likely result will be an economy so dominated by a
few corporate giants that it will be impossible for the state not
to play a more intrusive role in economic affairs.

In reaction to these views, other law and economics
scholars—many from the ascendant “Chicago School”—cautioned
that inclusion of any goals other than consumer welfare would
lead to chaos.7 That view came to prevail in the United States, to
the point that even under the Obama Administration, leaders of
the U.S. antitrust enforcement agencies expressed strongly the
opinion that the goals of antitrust law should be confined to
consumer welfare.
In 2014, Federal Trade Commission
Chairwoman Edith Ramirez warned an international audience
that although other goals may be worthy in themselves,
integrating them into competition analysis “can lead to poor
outcomes.”8 She pointed out that “competition agencies are

5
Joshua D. Wright & Angela M. Diveley, Unfair Methods of Competition After
the 2015 Commission Statement, 2015 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST L. 3 n.11 (quoting
Michael Pertschuk, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, New Directions for the FTC,
Remarks Before the Eleventh New England Antitrust Conference (Nov. 18, 1977),
reprinted in 308 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) (Supp. 1977)).
6
Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051,
1051 (1979).
7
Lawrence A. Sullivan, Book Review, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1214, 1214–15 (1975)
(reviewing MILTON HANDLER, HARLAN M. BLAKE, ROBERT PITOFSKY & HARVEY J.
GOLDSCHMID, TRADE REGULATION, CASES AND MATERIALS (1974)).
8
Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Keynote Address at the
Antitrust in Asia Conference: Core Competition Agency Principles: Lessons Learned
at the FTC (May 22, 2014).
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designed to be experts in competition law and are generally ill
equipped to undertake an analysis of non-competition public
interest factors,” and that if governments choose to advance other
objectives, “that is best done by agencies with the relevant
expertise.”9 The head of the United States’ Justice Department’s
Antitrust Division, Bill Baer, similarly remarked that
enforcement decisions should be “based solely on the competitive
effects and consumer benefits of the transaction or conduct being
reviewed.”10 This view was pointedly reflected in language that
the United States proposed for inclusion in the now-shelved
Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement: “Each Party shall adopt or
maintain
national
competition
laws
that
proscribe
anticompetitive business conduct, with the objective of promoting
economic efficiency and consumer welfare . . . .”11
But the other goals did not disappear in the United States.
Instead, they either have become the responsibility of other arms
of government or have become the object of legislative attention.
National security is the mission of the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”); jobs are the province
of the Department of Commerce and the U.S. Trade
Representative; small business is the responsibility of the Small
Business Administration; the environment is the realm of the
Environmental Protection Agency; diversity of viewpoints is an
objective of the Federal Communications Commission; and so
forth. Dispersion of economic and political power has become

9

Id.
Bill Baer, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
International Antitrust Enforcement: Progress Made; Work To Be Done 4 (Sept. 12,
2014) (“We must continue to seek broad international consensus on the principle
that enforcement decisions be based solely on the competitive effects and consumer
benefits of the transaction or conduct being reviewed. We must ensure that
enforcement decisions are not used to promote domestic or industrial policy goals,
protect state-owned or domestic companies from foreign competitors, or create
leverage in international trade negotiations.”).
11
Trans-Pacific Partnership art. 16.1, Feb. 4, 2016, https://ustr.gov/sites/default
/files/TPP-Final-Text-Competition.pdf (not yet in effect). President Trump withdrew
the United States as a signatory to the Trans-Pacific Partnership and from the
negotiating process. Withdrawal of the United States from the Trans-Pacific
Partnership Negotiations and Agreement, 82 Fed. Reg. 8497 (Jan. 23, 2017).
10
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largely a political issue, attracting growing attention within
Congress, academia, and the nation’s think tanks, not to mention
political campaigns.12
It should be noted that the triumph of the consumer welfare
standard in America has not meant that other goals are never
advanced by antitrust enforcement in the United States. Such
goals as health and safety, job creation, and national security all
have been advanced by antitrust enforcement in certain
instances, but only as a byproduct, when those goals coincided
with promoting consumer welfare.13
12
See, e.g., Binyamin Applebaum, Yellen Warns Global Strife Could Brake U.S.
Growth, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2016; Mohamed A. El-Erian, Opinion, The Fed Can’t
Save the Economy This Time, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2016.
13
For example, current U.S. antitrust law is sufficiently pragmatic to recognize
that in some instances, non-economic goals must be served in order to permit
competition to exist at all. In the Professional Engineers case, the Supreme Court
acknowledged that in certain instances—although not in that case—goals such as
safeguarding public health and safety require exceptions from normal antitrust
rules to assure that products can successfully be brought to market and compete.
Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 686–87, 692 (1978). In the
Broadcast Music case, the Court recognized that exceptions sometimes must be
made to permit the creation of products or services that would not otherwise exist.
Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1979). This was not a departure
but rather an acknowledgement that consumer welfare cannot be maximized if
products cannot otherwise be created or continue to be sold. See also Polk Bros., Inc.
v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 188 (7th Cir. 1985); Business Review
Letter 06-3 from Thomas O. Barnett, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Antitrust Div., to Steven John Fellman, Counsel for Linen Systems for Healthcare,
LLC (Aug. 8, 2006) (approving of proposed joint venture of regional textile
maintenance companies to market textile rental and laundry services to specialized
health care client); Business Review Letter 00-5 from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Att’y
Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., to Garret G. Rasmussen, Counsel for
Containers America, LLC (Mar. 8, 2000) (approving of proposed creation and
operation of joint selling and purchasing vehicle for five regional manufacturers of
steel drums). See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS (2000).
Likewise, antitrust enforcement aimed at promoting consumer welfare sometimes
results in a larger number of productive jobs and prevention of concentration of
economic power. For instance, blocking a merger that would have resulted in too
much concentration is likely to save efficient jobs that otherwise would have been
eliminated, while preventing further consolidation of economic power. Eliminating
practices that foreclose the entry of new competitors into a market is likely to foster
the growth of small business and the creation of jobs, while dissipating incumbents’
power over the market. Advancing consumer welfare can even advance national
security. Recently, the Defense Department threatened to ask Congress for special
legislation to elevate national security concerns over consumer welfare concerns in
order to prevent the Justice Department from approving too many mergers of
defense contractors, but the Justice Department assured the Defense Department
that a proper assessment of consumer welfare would result in the desired outcome.
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To be sure, these incidental effects are meaningful, but not
everyone in America has been in agreement that this goes far
enough to protect the American public or that consumer welfare
should be treated as the only recognized goal of antitrust law.
The 2016 Democratic Party Platform, for example, declared
support for what it termed the “historic purpose” of the antitrust
laws, “to protect competition and prevent excessively
consolidated economic and political power.”14 The prevention of
excessively consolidated political power may have been an
objective of American antitrust law once, but it had not been a
professed goal of U.S. enforcers for years.15
Even broader goals have been proposed in Congress.
Legislation has been introduced to inject a “net benefit” test,
similar to one that already applies in Canada, into reviews of
mergers, acquisitions, and other investments resulting in control
by foreign interests.16 Under this legislation, titled the “Foreign
Investment and Economic Security Act,” the mission of CFIUS
would be expanded to include not only reviewing covered
transactions to determine the effect on “national security,” but
also to determine whether the transaction is of “net benefit” to
the United States. This review would include weighing negative
effects against positive effects based on a variety of factors,
including employment, resource processing, utilization of parts
made in America, effect on productivity, technology transfers,
innovation in the United States, competition within the United
States, competition between the United States and other
countries, compatibility with U.S. industrial policy, compatibility
with U.S. cultural policy, whether a foreign person participating
In a joint statement, the Federal Trade Commission and Justice Department
explained that if a transaction has the potential to adversely affect national security
by lessening competition, the antitrust agencies “will not hesitate to take
appropriate enforcement action.” FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
JOINT STATEMENT ON PRESERVING COMPETITION IN THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY (Apr.
12, 2016).
14
2016 Democratic Platform, DEMOCRATIC NAT’L COMM. 11, http://s3.amazonaw
s.com/uploads.democrats.org/Downloads/2016_DNC_Platform.pdf (last visited Apr.
3, 2017).
15
Id. And, of course, if changes in the goals of antitrust law are to be made
without amending the statutes, on the theory that broader goals already are part of
the original intent behind the antitrust laws, the agencies will not achieve much
unless the judiciary agrees with their interpretation of those laws. It may be true
that historically the courts recognized antitrust goals beyond consumer welfare, but
more recent precedents have hardly embraced this position.
16
H.R. 5665, 114th Cong. § 3 (2016).
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in the transaction is controlled by a foreign government, and
whether that person adheres to U.S. principles of corporate
governance and law.17
On September 15, 2016, sixteen members of the United
States Congress—both Democrat and Republican—sent a letter
to the head of the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”)
requesting a report from that office on whether the mandate of
CFIUS should be broadened to add a form of net benefit test and
whether the definition of national security should be broadened
to address concerns about control of “the media and ‘soft power’
institutions.”18 On September 30, 2016, the GAO responded that
it would initiate a review in 2017.19
Other observers have championed the inclusion of still other
goals in antitrust enforcement. On June 29, 2016, Senator
Elizabeth Warren delivered a speech that attracted considerable
coverage in which she stated that concentrated markets can
harm small businesses and result in both “concentrated political
power” and the decline of the middle class.20 The “original
purpose” of the antitrust laws, she said, “was to fight
concentrated economic and political power.”21 She cited reports
published at about the same time as her speech by the Center for
American Progress and the Roosevelt Institute, the latter of
which advocated a “public interest standard for enforcement
actions.”22
The Center for American Progress’s report, Reviving
Antitrust, concluded that market power “distorts the distribution
of income and the allocation of resources, reduces incentives for
innovation, and underwrites . . . manipulation of political and

17

Id.
Letter from Rep. Robert Pittenger et al., House of Representatives, to Hon.
Gene L. Dodaro, Comptroller Gen., U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office (Sept. 15, 2016).
19
Letter from Katherine Siggerud, Managing Dir. of Cong. Relations, U.S. Gov’t
Accountability Office, to Rep. Robert Pittenger, House of Representatives (Sept. 30,
2016).
20
Senator Elizabeth Warren, Keynote Remarks at New America’s Open
Markets Program Event: Reigniting Competition in the American Economy (June
29, 2016).
21
Id. (emphasis omitted).
22
Id. (quoting ROOSEVELT INST., UNTAMED: HOW TO CHECK CORPORATE,
FINANCIAL, AND MONOPOLY POWER 20 (Nell Abernathy, Mike Konczal & Kathryn
Milani eds., 2016)).
18
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regulatory systems.”23 Among the solutions it proposed was the
appointment of a deputy director for competition policy within
the National Economic Council (“NEC”), with responsibility to
keep the President and the Director of the NEC informed of
economic trends and to “push policies beyond antitrust
enforcement to ensure strong competition.”24
The Roosevelt Institute report advocated revising the
antitrust statutes in general and the government’s merger
guidelines in particular “to promote a ‘public interest’ or ‘citizen
interest’ standard.”25 A new statute could “requir[e] agencies to
consider not just narrow price effects but also issues such as
market openness, competition, and innovation,” as well as a
company’s power over workers, and “the stability of global supply
chains and the financial system.”26
An article published in August 2016, under the auspices of
the American Antitrust Institute similarly blamed increased
economic concentration for rising inequality, the decline of small
business, the decline in job creation, and “a corrosive effect on
democracy.”27 The remedy it proposed was to “[r]einstate the
broader set of aims that once guided antitrust, balancing
efficiency goals with other objectives, including a commitment to
open markets in which small businesses have a fair opportunity
to compete.”28
At the same time, and apart from advocating changes to the
goals of antitrust, lawmakers, including both Democrats and
Republicans, began calling for stronger antitrust enforcement as
a means of revitalizing the economy. At a notable Senate
hearing in March 2016, Senators from both sides of the aisle
questioned the leaders of the FTC and the Justice Department as
to whether they were doing enough to enforce the antitrust
laws.29 These lawmakers did not propose that antitrust enforcers
23
MARC JARSULIC ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, REVIVING ANTITRUST: WHY
OUR ECONOMY NEEDS A PROGRESSIVE COMPETITION POLICY 22 (2016).
24
Id. at 20.
25
ROOSEVELT INST., UNTAMED: HOW TO CHECK CORPORATE, FINANCIAL, AND
MONOPOLY POWER 20 (Nell Abernathy, Mike Konczal & Kathryn Milani eds., 2016).
26
Id. at 21, 23.
27
Stacy Mitchell, The View from the Shop—Antitrust and the Decline of
America’s Independent Businesses, 61 ANTITRUST BULL. 498, 511 (2016).
28
Id. at 515.
29
Oversight of the Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy & Consumer Rights of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2016).
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necessarily should adopt new goals, but that more vigorous
enforcement itself would advance goals beyond consumer welfare,
including the creation of jobs, reduction of the United States’
trade imbalances, stemming the outflow of capital from the
United States, and combating wealth inequality.30 Antitrust
enforcement also became an issue in the 2016 Presidential
campaign, with Hillary Clinton calling for stronger enforcement
and Donald Trump raising the prospect of blocking certain
transactions.31
This has sparked a debate over just how much antitrust
enforcement is needed. Exactly how much antitrust enforcement
would it take to advance these objectives significantly? Every
known price-fixing conspiracy is already being prosecuted.
Should the enforcers hire more investigators to search out
conspiracies? If so, how many? Every merger of significant size
is already being reported in advance. Should smaller mergers be
made reportable? Should the enforcers lower the bar for bringing
a challenge? If so, by how much? Should enforcers bring more
cases challenging single-firm conduct that may be foreclosing
competitors? Which ones? Should the definition of “monopoly
power” be changed to reach unilateral conduct by companies with
smaller market shares? Should enforcers try to reinstitute per se
rules against potentially exclusionary practices such as tying?
Per se rules create certainty and foster compliance but

30

Id.
An October 3, 2016, speech by Hillary Clinton in Toledo, Ohio included the
following statement: “As president, I will appoint tough, independent authorities to
strengthen anti-trust enforcement and really scrutinize mergers and acquisitions, so
the big don’t keep getting bigger and bigger.” Daniel White, Read Hillary Clinton’s
Remarks From a Rally in Toledo, Ohio, TIME (Oct. 3, 2016), http://time.com/4517335
/hillary-clinton-transcript-toledo-ohio. Also in October 2016, Donald Trump criticized
AT&T’s proposed acquisition of Time Warner as an example of a “power structure”
rigged against the public. See Malathi Nayak et al., Time Warner Shares Fall on
Worries Trump May Block AT&T Deal; Bankers See M&A Pause, BUS. STANDARD
(Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.business-standard.com/article/reuters/time-warner-shares
-fall-on-worries-trump-may-block-at-t-deal-bankers-see-m-a-pause-116110901722_1
.html. In May 2016, Mr. Trump told Sean Hannity of Fox News that Amazon’s Jeff
Bezos has “got a huge antitrust problem because he’s controlling so much, Amazon is
controlling so much of what they are doing.” See Trump Says Washington Post
Owner Bezos Has 'Huge Antitrust Problem,' FOX NEWS (May 13, 2016),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2016/05/13/trump-says-washington-post-owner-bez
os-has-huge-antitrust-problem.html.
31
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sometimes at the risk of being overkill. With a few exceptions,
the proposals for greater enforcement have not been specific,32
but the sentiment is unmistakable.
This rash of dialogue represented a fascinating turn of
events, given that the goals of antitrust law have not captured
the public’s attention in years. Yet, even as the significance of
this debate has grown, it remains only half the story. It is
equally important to recognize that the debate over the goals of
antitrust law is not taking place in a geographic vacuum.
The United States may have elevated consumer welfare to
become the singular goal of competition law, but not every
jurisdiction sees it this way. Some foreign jurisdictions explicitly
integrate goals beyond consumer welfare into their competition
laws.33 Some nations include the goal of “national interest,”
which encompasses not only the control of national defense
assets but also the control of strategically important enterprises,
such as financial institutions, utilities, agriculture and food
Some include the goal of job creation and
processors.34
preservation, sometimes requiring pledges of job security as a
prerequisite to approval of transactions.35 Some include the goal
of promoting minority ownership opportunities or cultural
preservation.36
And some include the goal of combating government
subsidies that provide an advantage to certain companies over
others. In the European Union, such subsidization is called
“state aid,” and as companies like Apple have learned, combating
state aid is an integral goal of the European Competition
Commission.37 If a country provides subsidies in the form of tax

32
See ROOSEVELT INST., supra note 25, at 20. The Roosevelt Institute, for one,
advocates favoring presumptions and per se rules over the rule of reason and calls
upon the agencies to bring more cases challenging unilateral conduct.
33
See Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, Welfare Standards in U.S. and E.U.
Antitrust Enforcement, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2497, 2510, 2513 (2013).
34
Report of the Task Force on Foreign Investment Review 2015 A.B.A. SEC.
ANTITRUST L. 63.
35
Id. at 1, 48.
36
Id. at 1.
37
See European Commission Press Release, IP/16/2923, State Aid: Ireland Gave
Illegal Tax Benefits to Apple Worth Up to €13 Billion (Aug. 30, 2016); Brett Molina,
Apple Appeals EU’s $14B Ruling on Irish Taxes, USA TODAY (Dec. 19, 2016 10:09
AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2016/12/19/apple-ireland-appeal-eus
-14-billion-tax-ruling/95606010/. The Commission’s decision was appealed at the end
of 2016.
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breaks or direct aid to a company operating within its borders,
disadvantaging competitors elsewhere in the European Union,
this is considered a competition issue, not just a tax issue. In
contrast, the United States does not even have a term for state
aid, and incentives to lure companies from one state to another
have become commonplace.
What has emerged in the world today is a patchwork of
competition laws, all with the goal of consumer welfare, but
many with other goals as well. A catalogue of these laws and
these objectives can fill a book,38 but a few examples will
illustrate the variety that exists.
A core objective of the European Union’s competition law,
first adopted in 1957, is the promotion of integration of the
economies of the various EU member states.39 Combating
artificial barriers and state aid that would give a competitor from
one member state an advantage over competitors from other
member states was and is integral to this goal.
The competition regimes of numerous countries include a
range of goals.40 In South Africa, for example, the competition
law requires consideration of a multitude of factors, including not
only consumer welfare, but such national interest concerns as
employment prospects and the impact on less developed regions
of the country.41 This is markedly different from the pure
consumer welfare standard being applied by antitrust agencies in
the United States. In addition, not every jurisdiction assigns
responsibility for pursuing economic goals in the same way as the
United States.
Some, like China and South Africa, entrust their competition
authorities with responsibility for pursuing multiple goals and
balancing each against the others.42 South Africa has issued
38
See A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST L., supra note 34, at ii; Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (“OECD”), Public Interest Considerations in Merger
Control, at 4, DAF/COMP/WP3(2016)3 (June 30, 2016); INTERNATIONAL
COMPETITION NETWORK: UNILATERAL CONDUCT WORKING GRP., REPORT ON THE
OBJECTIVES OF UNILATERAL CONDUCT LAWS, ASSESSMENT OF DOMINANCE/
SUBSTANTIAL MARKET POWER, AND STATE-CREATED MONOPOLIES 2 (2007).
39
See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union arts. 101–02, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326).
40
See INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK: UNILATERAL CONDUCT
WORKING GRP., supra note 38, Annex A; OECD, supra note 38, at 7.
41
See Competition Act 89 of 1998, GN 1392 of GG 19412 (30 Oct. 1998).
42
See OECD, supra note 38, at 7, 9; see also Notice of the General Office of the
State Council on Launching the Security Review System for Mergers and
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extensive guidelines explaining how such an analysis should be
performed in reviewing mergers.43 This includes an assessment
as to whether a merger should be rejected on “public interest”
grounds, considering its impact on employment, small business,
disadvantaged populations, and the competitiveness of South
African industries.
Some jurisdictions, like Canada and Australia, assign
different agencies or officials the tasks of assessing different
economic goals. For example, in Canada, the Competition
Commission is responsible for protecting competition while the
Minister of Industry and the Minister of Canadian Heritage are
responsible for assuring that investments in Canada are of “net
benefit” to the nation and will not harm its national heritage.44
In Australia, the Competition and Consumer Commission is
responsible for protecting competition while the Treasurer, with
the advice of a Foreign Investment Review Board, is responsible
for assuring that investments in Australia are not contrary to the
“national interest,” taking into account a range of goals, which
include, but are not limited to, protecting competition.45
Typically, any one of these agencies or officials is authorized
to prohibit a practice or a transaction, regardless of how the
others rule, so that if any agency or official disapproves, the
practice or transaction is disallowed. For example, in Australia,
the Competition Commission approved the acquisition of
Australia’s largest grain producer, GrainCorp, by a U.S.-based
company, Archer-Daniels-Midland (“ADM”), in 2013, but

Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors (promulgated by the Gen.
Office of the St. Council, Feb. 3, 2011, effective Mar. 5, 2011) (China); Provisions of
the Ministry of Commerce for the Implementation of the Security Review System for
Merger and Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors (promulgated
by the Ministry of Commerce, Aug. 25, 2011, effective Sept. 1, 2011) Sept. 8, 2011
(China).
43
E.g., Guidelines on the Assessment of Public Interest Provisions in Merger
Regulation under the Competition Act 89 of 1998, GN 309 of GG 40039 (31 May
2016).
44
See Investment Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c 28.
45
About the ACCC, AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMM’N,
https://www.accc.gov.au/about-us/australian-competition-consumer-commission/ab
out-the-accc (last visited Apr. 4, 2017); Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975
(Cth) s 67 (Austl.).
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Australia’s Treasurer subsequently prohibited the deal on the
recommendation of the nation’s Foreign Investment Review
Board.46
In some jurisdictions, a minister or equivalent official may
reject a decision made by the competition commission and either
disapprove something the commission has approved or approve
something that the commission has disapproved. In Germany,
the Competition Commission (the Bundeskartellamt) decided to
block the acquisition of grocery chain Kaiser’s Tengelmann by
another grocery chain, Edeka, but the Minister of the Economy
overruled the Commission and allowed the acquisition to proceed
on the condition that Edeka protect the jobs of Kaiser
Tengelmann’s 16,000 employees for at least five years.47 In
Spain, the competition authority decided to block the merger of
gas and electricity companies Gas Natural and Endesa, but the
Council of Ministers overruled the authority and cleared the
deal, with conditions.48
Sometimes, different arms of government endeavor to
coordinate the timing of their deliberations in order to avoid the
awkwardness of conflicting decisions of this kind.49
How did we get to such a wide variety of approaches? In the
United States, the first federal antitrust statute was adopted in
1890.50 Although a handful of countries had competition laws
prior to World War II, most were adopted later. Not all countries
had the same economic priorities, and not all had the same type
of legal system. This resulted in a variety of objectives. The
United States, with its common law tradition, free market
economy, and abundant resources, was not in the same position
as every other country. In Europe, a different legislative model
emerged and nations around the world tended to adopt laws

46

See OECD, supra note 38, at 14.
See Regulators Overruled in Supermarket Takeover, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Mar.
17, 2016), http://www.dw.com/en/regulators-overruled-in-supermarket-takeover/a-19
122420.
48
See OECD, supra note 38, at 15.
49
For example, in 2011, the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal
Communications Commission conducted investigations of the proposed acquisition
by AT&T of T-Mobile USA during the same period of time.
50
The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tipsadvice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws (last visited Apr. 4,
2017).
47
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based on the U.S. model, the European model, or some
combination of the two, with countless variations and
innovations.
At first, each nation’s laws had limited impact in other
jurisdictions. Although there was a great deal of discussion
within academic circles about “harmonization” of these laws, or
even real “convergence,” genuine differences remain. Occasional
efforts to craft a universal competition code all have resulted in
failure.51 There has been productive research conducted within
the International Competition Network, an organization of
competition agencies from around the world, together with study
in other quarters, including the OECD and the World Bank
Group, but most of this work so far has focused on cataloging the
differences that exist among jurisdictions, rather then on
reconciling them.52
With economic globalization, however, it has become
increasingly difficult to contain the impact of each nation’s
competition law within that nation’s borders. Mergers and
acquisitions of any consequence spill across multiple countries.
Practices such as licensing restrictions or exclusivity agreements
often apply to multiple jurisdictions. For agencies enforcing
these laws and corporations trying to adopt global practices or
close global transactions, the disharmony has become more than
an academically interesting phenomenon and can be downright
frustrating.
More than that, for governments confronting asymmetrical
enforcement goals among nations, the disharmony has become a
political problem. For how long can a country like the United
States adhere to a pristine antitrust standard of consumer
welfare when its trading partners are pursuing other goals like
“national interest” in enforcing their own competition laws,
especially when these goals that can exclude American-based
companies from opportunities that their competitors based
abroad would be permitted to take advantage of in the United
States?

51
See Richard M. Steuer, Antitrust Overhaul, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 681, 681
(2015).
52
ICN Factsheet and Key Messages, INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK (Apr. 2009),
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc608.pdf.
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Yet, that is where America finds itself today. Americanbased ADM was prevented from acquiring Australia’s GrainCorp
under Australia’s “national interest” test and before that CocaCola was prevented from acquiring one of China’s leading juice
manufacturers under China’s public interest test.53 Around the
same time, however, a Chinese company was permitted to
acquire America’s largest pork producer, Smithfield Foods,
because, among other things, the United States had no “national
interest” test.54 That deal was closely scrutinized in Congress
and elsewhere, but it did not violate the antitrust laws under the
consumer welfare test or threaten national security, as that
concept was being interpreted, and was allowed to close.55 This is
not to say that the Smithfield deal necessarily was contrary to
America’s national interest, but that although there was
widespread public concern, there was no mechanism to subject
the transaction to a national interest review.
So, what is the right direction for the future? The issues
confronting the United States today are which goals to pursue,
who should be responsible for pursuing these goals, and how,
when these goals conflict, should they be prioritized and
balanced. This sounds simple enough, until taking a closer look
at the choices that would need to be made.
I.

WHICH GOALS TO CHOOSE?

What should be the goals of antitrust law in the United
States? Consumer welfare is a given. There is no disagreement
that low prices, high quality, and high output at low cost should
be a key goal.
Keeping a lid on the concentration of economic and political
power is considerably more controversial. Often, the goal of
safeguarding consumer welfare requires limiting concentration,
as when a merger is disallowed or a monopoly is broken up to
prevent supracompetitive prices. But if limiting concentration of
53
See Hard to Swallow: China Indicates the Real Targets of its Anti-Monopoly
Law: Outsiders, ECONOMIST, (Mar. 21, 2009), http://www.economist.com/node/133
31326.
54
Parija Kavilanz, China’s Expensive Love Affair with Pork, CNN: MONEY (May
29, 2013), http://money.cnn.com/2013/05/29/news/companies/smithfield-foods/index.
55
Shuanghui International Holdings Ltd. acquired Smithfield Foods in 2013 for
$4.7 billion. Dana Mattioli, et al., China Makes Biggest U.S. Play, WALL ST. J. (May
30, 2013, 7:42 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324412
604578512722044165756.
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power were recognized as a goal unto itself, would the amount of
permissible concentration in markets be the same as it would be
today? If four competitors are sufficient to assure competitive
prices in a market, are four enough to assure the minimum level
of concentration of economic and political power? How would
that be measured?
There are two principal means to combat concentration:
prevent mergers and break up dominant companies.
If
containing the degree of economic and political power existing in
a market were an independent goal of antitrust enforcement,
enforcers and courts theoretically would be empowered, under
the antitrust laws, to block a merger that is not expected to
create the power to raise prices or reduce output, and is not
expected to facilitate collusion to fix prices, limit output, or divide
customers, but nevertheless is expected to lead to an undesirable
level of political power. Would political power be measured
within relevant markets, as with consumer welfare analysis, or
would market definition be less relevant? If the nation’s largest
automaker wanted to merge with the nation’s largest food
producer and the nation’s largest telecom provider, at what point
would this result in too much power, regardless of whether there
would be a likely impact on prices or output in any relevant
market? What if all three were being acquired by some other
country’s sovereign wealth fund? Without a yardstick, the
answers are likely to depend on which administration is in power
at any time under a test of “I know it when I see it.”56 Some may
find this acceptable and, of course, any interpretation of the
antitrust laws would be subject to review in the courts, which
would need to agree with that interpretation, but predictability
would be diminished.
In reality, much of the concern that has been expressed over
the concentration of power today stems from remorse over the
approval of various large mergers in years past,57 and there is
only so much that antitrust enforcement can accomplish to undo
those deals. Assuming that such remorse is warranted, the most

56
Cf., Bon-Ton Stores, Inc. v. New York, 881 F. Supp. 860, 869–70 & n.5
(W.D.N.Y. 1994) (“customers know a department store when they see it” (citing
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring))).
57
See, e.g., Justin Elliott, The American Way, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 11, 2016),
https://www.propublica.org/article/airline-consolidation-democratic-lobbying-antitr
ust.
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meaningful answer is to make antitrust enforcement vigorous
enough going forward to prevent this from happening again.
Despite the recent criticism, antitrust enforcement actually has
grown stronger over the past several years,58 and this has
resulted not only in stopping or trimming some major deals and
practices, but also in averting other deals and practices in
lawyers’ offices before they ever progress beyond the talking
stage.59
As for undoing completed mergers and acquisitions that, in
retrospect, seem ill-considered, these are harder to tackle. There
is some precedent for challenging acquisitions that were
completed years before and were never reviewed. Theoretically,
it even would be possible for the enforcement agencies to
challenge a deal that they did review and allowed to close long
before.60 Conduct and conditions change, and in compelling
cases, an ex post challenge could succeed.
Unless such
challenges were numerous and largely successful, however, they
would do little to change the face of the American economy.
As for attacking size itself, the National Commission for the
Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures issued a
recommendation in 1979 for the adoption of a “no-fault
monopolization” standard under which enforcers could obtain
relief in monopolization cases without the need to prove willful
acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power, which is the
current standard.61 Instead, the new standard would have
required a court, upon a showing of “persistent monopoly power,”
to formulate a plan to dissipate that power, on the assumption
that “persistent monopoly power, in all but the most exceptional
instance, can only result from culpable conduct.”62 The proposal
had its proponents but ultimately failed to win much support,

58
See Loretta E. Lynch, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Keynote Luncheon
Address at the 64th Annual American Bar Association Antitrust Law Spring
Meeting (Apr. 6, 2016).
59
Id.
60
See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 597 (1957)
(explaining that the legality of an acquisition may be determined at “any time when
the acquisition threatens to ripen into a prohibited effect”).
61
See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966); NAT’L
COMM’N FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES, REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 156, 410 (1979).
62
NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES, supra
note 61, at 156.
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even from enforcers themselves.63
Today, the prospect of
authorizing suits to break up existing corporations for
dominating too large a share of a relevant market, regardless of
whether it can be proved that they engaged in willful acquisition
or maintenance of their market power, seems no more realistic
an option than it was in 1979. Moreover, even if a few megacompanies were broken up, this would affect only a handful of
industries, and the overall effect might well be more symbolic
than real.
To be realistic, if the political power of dominant companies
is of serious concern to lawmakers today, the antitrust laws can
provide only a partial solution. Antitrust enforcement can limit
the power of corporations going forward, and the containment of
political power is a foreseeable side effect of vigorous antitrust
enforcement, but antitrust enforcers alone can do only so much to
limit existing corporate power either by stepping up enforcement
against future acts or by trying to break up past mergers and
existing monopolies.
What about jobs? If creating and preserving jobs were a
discrete goal of antitrust enforcement, enforcers and courts
theoretically could block a merger or outlaw a practice that
impedes the preservation of jobs, even if there were little
prospect of an adverse impact on consumer welfare. This
theoretically could happen in South Africa,64 although under
South Africa’s new guidelines, it is possible for merging
companies to justify a loss of jobs by showing that only by
reducing employment can the companies reduce prices to
consumers. But again, how would one measure the anticipated
effect on employment? Relative to the total employment in the
same market, or industry, or in the country as a whole? If a
merger or practice is expected to have little adverse effect on
consumer welfare but is expected to result in jobs being
eliminated or shipped abroad, how can the impact on jobs be
measured in a way that can be compared to the effect on prices
and output?

63
Milton Handler & Richard M. Steuer, Attempts to Monopolize and No-Fault
Monopolization, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 190 n.262 (1980).
64
See Guidelines on the Assessment of Public Interest Provisions in Merger
Regulation under the Competition Act 89 of 1998, GN 309 of GG 40039, at 5.6 (31
May 2016).
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To complicate matters further, we know that a reduction in
factory jobs can have the ripple effect of eliminating jobs in
support products and services, from restaurants and dry cleaners
to residential housing and police departments. How should this
be taken into account? On the other hand, the preservation of
inefficient jobs can be a drag on the economy in the long term,
not a benefit. Should this be taken into account and, if so, how
can it be measured? Experience teaches that preservation of
inefficient jobs rarely benefits an economy for very long.
What about small business? If the Jeffersonian tradition of
preserving small farmers and small merchants is to be carried
on, enforcers and courts theoretically could block mergers or
outlaw practices that could be expected to impede the entry,
growth, and survival of small businesses, regardless of the effect
on consumer welfare. But how would “small business” be defined
and how would one measure the impact of a transaction or
practice on small businesses? Preventing the foreclosure of
competition already is a goal of antitrust law, encompassed
within the concept of consumer welfare. There is debate over
whether enforcement against unilateral practices that foreclose
smaller competitors has been effective enough,65 but no debate
over whether combating foreclosure of competition already is a
goal of antitrust law. If protection of small business were made a
discrete antitrust goal unto itself, could enforcers and courts
prevent transactions and practices that would not result in
higher prices or less output, but still would jeopardize the
survival of some smaller competitors? How would such impact be
measured and what weight should it be given? We have some
precedent in the form of the Robinson-Patman Act—which was
65
The treatment of unilateral conduct has been hotly debated within the United
States. In 2016, the Roosevelt Institute recommended that America’s antitrust
agencies “should litigate to test the boundaries of the law and to alert monopolist
firms that certain conduct (i.e., tying/bundling practices, predatory pricing, exclusive
dealing) will be closely scrutinized.” See ROOSEVELT INST., supra note 25, at 22. The
2016 report of the Center for American Progress included the observation that “there
have been few challenges to unilateral actions to expand or preserve market power
by those who have it,” and recommended that both the FTC and the Department of
Justice try building on past precedents to bring a greater number of unilateral
conduct cases. See JARSULIC ET AL., supra note 23, at 2, 17. Similarly, the article
published under the auspices of the American Antitrust Institute in August 2016,
urged that America “[d]o more to address market power . . . by taking more
enforcement actions against companies that unilaterally harm competition.” See
Mitchell, supra note 27, at 42.
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enacted during the Great Depression to protect small
businesses—but the Supreme Court recently instructed that in
most cases even this act should be interpreted to require injury
to competition itself, not just to small businesses.66
What about other goals? If such goals as protection of the
environment or the rights of indigenous peoples were among the
goals of American antitrust law, antitrust enforcers and courts
theoretically could block a deal that would not be expected to
adversely affect consumer welfare but would threaten these other
objectives. How could these variables be measured and weighed?
Other countries do it, so it can be done, but it would add
additional layers of complexity and uncertainty, and force
antitrust enforcers to make judgments about entirely unfamiliar
issues.
What about “national interest?” If protecting national
interest were a separate goal of antitrust enforcement, antitrust
enforcers theoretically could block an acquisition that would
unduly threaten a critical national interest, such as control over
the nation’s food supply, financial markets, energy,
transportation, or communications, regardless of the acquisition’s
anticipated effect on consumer welfare. But how would an
enforcer or other official assess a threat to national interest?
Would it depend on the nationality of the acquirer? That is not
always easy to establish.67 Would it depend on whether the
acquirer is a private business or individual, or a state-owned
enterprise or sovereign wealth fund? How would one measure a
threat to national interest? Would it somehow be weighed
against consumer welfare, and where would the line be drawn?
One answer is that if CFIUS already can measure national
security concerns, it should be possible to measure national
interest concerns. Another answer is that if other countries’
competition agencies can do it, including China’s and South
Africa’s, U.S. officials theoretically should be able to do it too.

66
See Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164, 181
(2006) (“[W]e would resist interpretation geared more to the protection of existing
competitors than to the stimulation of competition.”).
67
See, e.g., Michael Forsythe & Jonathan Ansfield, A Chinese Mystery: Who
Owns a Firm on a Global Shopping Spree?, N.Y. TIMES: DEAL BOOK (Sept. 1, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/02/business/dealbook/anbang-global-shoppingspree-china-mystery-ownership.html.
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And what about state aid? If subsidization of U.S.-based
companies is becoming an issue abroad, can the United States
ignore subsidization of foreign-based competitors? How would
this be incorporated into an antitrust analysis? And what about
tax breaks offered by states, counties, and municipalities within
the United States? Would limitations on domestic tax subsidies
even be constitutional?
These are hard questions. There is a preference among
many enforcers and scholars for measurable criteria for
conducting antitrust analysis. Measurable variables, such as
concentration ratios and price elasticity, are usually favored over
such variables as changes in political power or national interest.
Econometricians routinely participate in antitrust deliberations,
but not political economists. Nevertheless, to exclude factors
that are difficult to measure may concede too much in the
interest of expediency and may place the United States at a
disadvantage with respect to other jurisdictions. For example, if
a merger poses a borderline threat to prices and output, but is
almost certain to result in a substantial increase in the power to
influence government decisions affecting the industry or a
substantial loss of jobs, is this something that American antitrust
enforcers should be required to ignore? If they must ignore it,
who will review it? Congress cannot prevent a merger on its
own, and today, unless the industry is subject to another
regulatory authority or there is a national security issue, no
authority will weigh in.
So, what is the answer? The antitrust laws already contain
the kernels of many of the goals under discussion and,
theoretically, many of these goals could be characterized as
having an impact on consumer welfare in the long run to some
extent. If political power becomes too concentrated, firms might
have greater opportunity to engage in lobbying and regulatory
capture and ultimately to raise prices to consumers above a
competitive level. If jobs in America disappear, this not only may
harm consumer welfare through higher prices commanded by
foreign producers, but also may harm producer welfare by
contracting demand.68 If small businesses are foreclosed from
competing, innovation might be stifled and consumers might be

68
See Richard M. Steuer, Jobs and Antitrust, 23 ANTITRUST MAG. 98, 101
(2009).
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denied better products at lower prices.
These often are
theoretical and speculative outcomes, to be sure, none of which
likely would be sufficient in itself to enable an antitrust enforcer
to win a case in court. Yet in those cases where the applicable
standard is threatened harm to competition, which is the
standard applicable to mergers and to practices that foreclose
access to customers, rather than harm to competition that is
already in progress, it might be appropriate to recognize these
factors as “tie-breakers” in close cases.
It is important in this context to recognize that there are two
broad categories of antitrust offenses under U.S. law—those that
require proof of an immediate anticompetitive effect, including
per se offenses where that effect may be presumed from the
conduct, and those that instead require proof of a threat to lessen
competition. Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits acquisitions
the effect of which “may be substantially to lessen competition, or
to tend to create a monopoly.”69 Section 3 of the Clayton Act
prohibits exclusive dealing and tying where the effect “may be to
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in
any line of commerce.”70 In these latter instances, reference to a
69

15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012).
15 U.S.C. § 14 (2012). In recent years, as a result of a series of court decisions
and commentary summarizing those decisions, the incipiency doctrine has been
marginalized to some degree, but it remains the law. For example, the antitrust
treatise of the American Bar Association’s Section of Antitrust Law summarizes the
court and Federal Trade Commission decisions as “effectively merging the mode of
analysis” under Section 3 of the Clayton Act, Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and
Section 5 of the FTC Act into a rule of reason standard. 1 A.B.A. SEC. OF ANTITRUST
L., ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 214 (7th ed. 2012); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.
& FED. TRADE COMMISSION, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (1995) (citing Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am.,
Inc., 833 F.2d 1342, 1352 (9th Cir. 1987)) (“In evaluating transactions, the trend of
recent authority is to use the same analysis employed in the evaluation of tying
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act to assess a defendant’s liability under Section 3
of the Clayton Act.”). A proposed 2016 update of the Guidelines states that, “In
evaluating transactions, courts use the same analysis employed in the evaluation of
tying under Section 1 of the Sherman Act to assess a defendant’s liability under
Section 3 of the Clayton Act.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N,
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR INT’L ENFORCEMENT & OPERATIONS
(proposed Nov. 1, 2016). As authority, the new draft cites a Seventh Circuit opinion
where the court observed, “Though some old cases say otherwise, the standards for
adjudicating tying under the two statutes are now recognized to be the same.”
Sheridan v. Marathon Petrol. Co., 530 F.3d 590, 592 (7th Cir. 2008). However, none
of the cases that Sheridan cites actually stands for the proposition that the
incipiency doctrine no longer exists. Nor do any of the authorities relied on by those
cases. See, e.g., 9 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
70
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“tie breaker” can inform the assessment of a threat to
competition. A tie-breaker approach is not unprecedented, and
already is reflected in the horizontal merger guidelines issued by
the U.S. Department of Justice and United States Federal Trade
Commission.71
These guidelines take a skeptical view of
efficiency defenses raised to justify mergers and acquisitions, but
recognize that in close cases, a legitimate efficiencies argument
can make the difference.72 Of course, there the tie breaker is a
justification, not a threatened harm, but it is a tie breaker
nevertheless.
In close cases, the antitrust enforcers routinely hear an
earful from legislators, interest groups, and the public about such
factors as employment, concentration of power, and foreclosure of
small businesses.73 While the enforcers do their best to shut this
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 1719b (3d ed. 2011).
Each case relies on an earlier case that draws upon both statutes but, upon analysis,
not one of those precedents holds that the incipiency doctrine has been repealed.
Even if any of them did, no judicial opinion—even that of the Supreme Court—can
abrogate a Constitutional act of Congress. The fact is that although the elements of
proof of an offense under Section 3 of the Clayton Act and Section 1 of the Sherman
Act (and Section 5 of the FTC Act) are largely the same—market power,
conditioning, etc.—the degree to which a plaintiff must demonstrate that
competition has been impeded is different. There is a material difference between
needing to prove an unreasonable restraint of competition and needing to prove that
the effect of a practice or transaction “may be” to substantially lessen competition or
“tend to” create a monopoly. Indeed, Areeda & Hovenkamp explicitly acknowledge
that, with regard to exclusive dealing, not all courts apply the same test under the
Clayton Act and the Sherman Act, with “a probable majority of courts hold[ing] that
the Clayton Act test is easier for a plaintiff to meet than the Sherman Act test.” Id.
¶ 1719b n.22. See also id. ¶ 1800c4 (“In tying arrangement cases a few courts have
followed the rule suggested in Times-Picayune of applying a more aggressive test
under the Clayton Act than under the Sherman Act, but most apply the same test
under both statutes. Clearly this would be the most sensible approach to exclusive
dealing as well. Nevertheless, the cases are divided, with a likely majority stating
that the Clayton Act requires a smaller showing of anticompetitive effects.”)
(citations omitted).
71
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES § 10 (2010).
72
Id. (“The greater the potential adverse competitive effect of a merger, the
greater must be the cognizable efficiencies, and the more they must be passed
through to customers, for the Agencies to conclude that the merger will not have an
anticompetitive effect in the relevant market. . . . In the Agencies’ experience,
efficiencies are most likely to make a difference in merger analysis when the likely
adverse competitive effects, absent the efficiencies, are not great.”).
73
For example, when airline mergers were under review, labor unions and bigcity mayors tried to persuade the Justice Department not to challenge under the
antitrust laws with the promise to preserve jobs in those cities. When hospital
mergers were under review, the hospitals urged the FTC and Justice Department
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out, these groups would not keep commenting unless they
thought they were being heard. Serious consideration needs to
be given to acknowledging that in those instances where the legal
standard is a “threatened” lessening of competition or
“threatened” creation of monopoly power, evidence of such factors
as threats to jobs and threats of excess political power
legitimately may be considered in making antitrust decisions as
to whether there is a demonstrable threat of long-term harm to
consumer welfare.
To characterize these factors as “noneconomic” or “non-competition” factors, as some do,74 is to ignore
the long-term impact they can have on consumer welfare. Just
because a factor is hard to measure or may take a longer time to
impact competition is not reason enough to ignore it, if it bears
on the purpose for having antitrust laws and the long-term
health of competition.
This does not mean that antitrust decisions should turn on
the impact on political power, jobs, or small businesses if not
accompanied by immediate or threatened harm to consumer
welfare.
Making the containment of political power, the
preservation of jobs, or the preservation of small businesses goals
of antitrust enforcement in the absence of threatened harm to
consumer welfare would do more harm than good. Blocking
mergers and breaking up companies when there is no real threat
to competition under the consumer welfare standard would risk
impeding economic progress. Requiring the preservation of jobs
as a discrete goal of antitrust, even if there is no threat to
consumer welfare, would perpetuate unproductive jobs without
creating productive jobs. Such employment requirements have
been imposed in other countries for limited periods of time and
they can afford workers time to consider their options, but
blocking a deal simply in order to perpetuate jobs is a recipe for
inefficiency. Likewise, making antitrust determinations solely
for the purpose of preserving particular small competitors rather
than preserving opportunities for competition itself—which of
not to challenge with promises to freeze prices. When university agreements on
scholarships and athletics were under review, the universities urged the Justice
Department not to bring a challenge in order to preserve academic traditions. In
each instance, the enforcement agencies tried their best to exclude these other
factors and to focus exclusively on the anticipated effect on consumer welfare.
74
Diane R. Hazel, Competition in Context: The Limitations of Using Competition
Law as a Vehicle for Social Policy in the Developing World, 37 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 275,
306, 308 (2015).
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course includes competition from small businesses—would be
counterproductive. Where there is no serious threat to consumer
welfare, antitrust enforcement to contain political power,
perpetuate jobs, or perpetuate small businesses is not an
appropriate or particularly effective instrument. At the same
time, where the applicable standard is proof of a threat to lessen
competition, and there is evidence of an appreciable threat of
higher prices or diminished output, the added existence of
demonstrable threats of excessive power, loss of jobs, or
elimination of small businesses may help to confirm the threat to
consumer welfare and the advisability of taking enforcement
action.
In contrast, national security and national interest concerns
in the context of foreign investment review are in a category of
their own. Regardless of the impact on consumer welfare, there
is a geopolitical dimension to these concerns that is not
adequately reflected in the consumer welfare standard. This is
not to suggest that foreign investment in the United States
should be discouraged or unreasonably limited, but in a world
where most of America’s principal trading partners have imposed
national interest barriers in one form or another, it would hardly
be reckless for the United States to adopt a formal national
interest mechanism of its own. National interest tests already
exist in Canada, Australia, China, Japan, Korea, and most of the
countries in the European Union. New legislation could be
enacted to invest America’s antitrust authorities, or some other
arm of government or an entirely new body, with responsibility
for reviewing transactions on the basis of “national interest,”
including any or all of the goals described earlier.75
Another alternative is simply to take a more expansive view,
under existing legislation, of the meaning of “national security”
and the scope of the authority of CFIUS to review mergers,
acquisitions, and takeovers by foreign persons that threaten or
75
Congress could conduct hearings and adopt measures announcing its intent to
either reaffirm or modify the goals of the antitrust laws. Congress has debated bills
of this kind before, and could again. The Foreign Investment and Economic Security
bill described earlier offers one model, embracing nearly every possible goal and
resting ultimate decision-making power with a select committee and the president,
but many other approaches are possible, as well. Alternatively, the enforcement
agencies could announce their interpretation of the existing antitrust laws, with the
courts having the last word as to whether that interpretation properly represents
the intent of the Congress that enacted each of those laws.
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impair national security.76 Already, CFIUS has interpreted
national security to include investments not only in defense
contractors but in the technology sector and strategic
infrastructure. Other nations take a similarly expansive view.77
Still another route is to empower sector regulators having
discretion to approve or disapprove a transaction in a sector of
the economy with authority to consider national security or
national interest on their own. In the telecom industry, for
example, the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”)
regularly has been provided advice by “Team Telecom,” an
informal working group including staff-level representatives of
the Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security,
and Department of Defense, which makes recommendations to
the FCC concerning whether or not it should approve license
applications that raise national security concerns.78 There is no
statutory authority for this body or this process, but the FCC has
discretion to approve or disapprove license applications and
presumably is entitled to take advice as it sees fit in carrying out
that responsibility. Although such a process would not work in
all sectors of the economy, it could be applied by any agency with
comparable authority.
Of course, in a real sense this is a trade issue more than it is
an antitrust issue. If the reason for adopting a “national
interest” or “net benefits” test is that other countries are
subjecting American-based companies to such tests, the ultimate
76
The current authority is conferred pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 4565(b)(1)(A)(i)
(2012). See also Exec. Order No. 11858, 40 Fed. Reg. 20,263 (May 7, 1975), amended
by 31 C.F.R. § 800.101 (2016).
77
Reportedly, the White House also considered a proposal to expand the scope of
national security review in the context of the telecom industry to include review of
transactions not involving foreign persons at all but still having an impact on
national security. The National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (“NITA”), which is a division of the Department of Commerce that
advises the White House regarding telecommunications policy issues, reportedly has
proposed broadening the scope of reviews by Team Telecom, an interagency panel
with representatives from the Departments of Homeland Security, Defense, Justice,
State, and Treasury, together with representatives from the FBI and United States
Trade Representative, to reach petitions that do not involve foreign ownership of
U.S. carriers. See Jenna Ebersole, FCC OKs Team Telecom Review Process Reform
Proposal, LAW360 (June 24, 2016, 3:27 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/
810734/fcc-oks-team-telecom-review-process-reform-proposal.
78
Proposed FCC Rules for Team Telecom Review of Applications with Foreign
Ownership, Shorten Timeframes, Add Burdens, WOMBLE CARLYLE (June 30, 2016),
http://www.wcsr.com/Insights/Alerts/2016/June/Proposed-FCC-Rules-for-TeamTelecom-Review-of-Applications-with-Foreign-Ownership.
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answer may lie in adopting an equivalent test and negotiating
mutual exceptions. Potentially, America could adopt a national
interest test that provides a different standard for transactions
involving entities from countries with which America has
negotiated agreements, allowing American-based entities to
invest in those countries without unreasonable limitations.79
Without a national interest test of its own, however, the United
States presumably would find it harder to negotiate agreements
of this kind.
Plainly, there is more than one possible approach for
addressing national interest. The only wrong answer would be
not to confront the issue of asymmetrical barriers at all.
II. WHO SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR EACH GOAL?
If America’s goals are modified, who should take
responsibility for them? The current division of responsibility
may work reasonably well in most instances, but it was not the
product of some grand plan. Rather, it was the result of
incremental agency growth over the years.
What should the division of responsibility be?
The
possibilities include the following: (1) assigning each of multiple
authorities responsibility for making an assessment of
compatibility with a narrow set of goals; (2) assigning the
competition authority responsibility for balancing all or most the
goals; or (3) assigning another arm of government responsibility
for balancing all or most of the goals.
There are several models for these alternatives from which
to choose. First, assign each agency one or more goals, which
could result in more than one agency assessing competition
issues, and provide each agency the authority to veto a
transaction or practice. This is the model currently in effect in
the United States and numerous other countries, which have
competition agencies, national security agencies, and multiple
specialized regulatory agencies, such as banking commissions,
79
The September 15, 2016 letter from sixteen members of Congress to the GAO
asked the GAO to report on whether the mandate of CFIUS should be broadened to
“prohibit investment in a U.S. industry by a foreign company whose government
prohibits foreign investment in that same industry.” Letter from Rep. Robert
Pittenger et al., House of Respresentatives, to Hon. Gene L. Dodaro, Comptroller
Gen., U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office (Sept. 15, 2016). This proposal derived from
the 2012 Annual Report of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission.
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communications commissions, energy commissions, and
transportation commissions to exercise authority—sometimes
exclusive authority—over transactions and practices involving
entities within their areas of responsibility. Second, assign each
agency one or more goals but enable some agencies to override
the vetoes of others, as occurred in Germany and Spain. Third,
assign the antitrust authorities responsibility for balancing
multiple goals, as in South Africa and China.
Lastly, assign the antitrust authorities responsibility for
applying the consumer welfare standard and assign another
authority, such as an expanded CFIUS, a new foreign investment
review board, or the Secretary of Commerce, responsibility for
balancing multiple goals under a “net benefit” or “national
interest” test, as in Canada and Australia, with each authority
having the power to disapprove a transaction or practice.
In the United States, the dispersion of responsibility among
multiple agencies has existed for some time, with each agency
pursuing a somewhat different set of goals with some overlap.
One can argue that the principle of “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it”
would counsel to leave well enough alone in this respect,
especially in a country like the United States, which can afford
the expense of operating multiple regulatory agencies. Although
there are occasional conflicts between agencies, these are
infrequent and tend to be worked out.
Could there be greater coordination between and among
agencies? There already has been progress on this score, and
more can be made, but if this is the course chosen improvements
should be pursued. One possibility is to appoint an official to act
as liaison among agencies with authority to review transactions
or practices, to help assure that the agencies do not act at cross
purposes even if they do not have liaisons of their own. In the
same vein, on April 15, 2016, President Obama issued an
executive order to all federal agencies directing them to identify
specific actions they can take to detect anticompetitive behavior,
to refer perceived antitrust offenses to the U.S. Justice
Department and U.S. Federal Trade Commission when
appropriate, and to identify actions they themselves can take
within their own areas of responsibility to address undue
burdens on competition.80
80

Exec. Order No. 13725, 81 Fed. Reg. 23,417 (Apr. 15, 2016).
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As described earlier, some countries assign their competition
agencies responsibility for assessing and weighing not only
consumer welfare, but other goals as well. This can be daunting,
but every town council and zoning board routinely faces the
challenge of weighing competing goals, usually with far less
analytical support.81
Nevertheless, the arguments against
assigning competition agencies authority for applying other goals
are that these agencies are ill equipped to perform non-economic
analysis, and that such an approach would concentrate too much
discretion within the competition authorities. If, for instance, the
Federal Trade Commission were tasked with conducting a “net
benefit” analysis, considering all the goals discussed earlier, it
would require greater resources. It also would need the political
strength to withstand the criticism it would inevitably attract
year in and year out from disappointed parties and their
supporters.
Some countries, such as Canada and Australia, have
established authorities separate from competition authorities to
oversee foreign investment, applying a wide variety of goals
either apart from consumer welfare or, as in Australia, including
consumer welfare.82 A model like that adopted in Australia
would contemplate the creation of a foreign investment review
board to advise a cabinet member or the president, who in turn
would have authority to disapprove foreign investments,
applying a “national interest” or “net benefit” test.
If such an arm of government were assigned responsibility in
the United States for balancing all these goals in the context of
foreign investment, who has the breadth of experience, depth of
wisdom, and political respect to make such judgments? The
National Economic Council, as has been suggested by the Center
for American Progress?83 Would its determination be subject to
judicial review, and under what standard?
What about
expanding the responsibilities of CFIUS, as proposed under the
Foreign Investment and Economic Security bill,84 to apply a “net
benefit” test to foreign acquisitions of control regardless of
81
ROOSEVELT INST., supra note 25, at 21 (stating that “regulators and enforcers
are routinely tasked with balancing a variety of goals and priorities.”).
82
U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Economic & Business Affairs, 2015 Investment
Climate Statement – Australia (2015); U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Economic &
Business Affairs, 2015 Investment Climate Statement – Canada (2015).
83
JARSULIC ET AL., supra note 23, at 20.
84
See supra note 16.
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whether those acquisitions pose a threat to national security?
Under that proposal, the Committee’s determination would be
subject to review by the President, but otherwise would be nonreviewable.
What about creating a new body, modeled on Australia’s
Foreign Investment Review Board? How would it be composed
and who would appoint its members? Would it be modeled on the
Federal Trade Commission, with members from more than one
political party serving fixed terms or would it be reconstituted by
each administration, like the Council of Economic Advisors?
Who would have the ultimate responsibility—the Treasury
Secretary? The Commerce Secretary? The President? What
would be the threshold for review? Would judicial review be
possible and, if so, under what standard?
The simplest approach might be to expand the mission of
CFIUS by defining “national security” to include economic
security, or “national interest,” and to create a new advisory
board, with adequate staffing, to provide the support that CFIUS
would need to fulfill a broader mission with respect to
acquisitions of foreign control that do not raise issues of national
defense or homeland security. Depending upon the scope of this
new authority, there might be calls to add provisions to allow
judicial review in those instances where neither national defense
nor homeland security is involved.85
It would be easiest to leave well enough alone, of course, but
if the American economy truly is being threatened by the current
approach, a new assignment of responsibility should be
considered.
There are several viable alternatives, as just
described, each of which has pros and cons. What is clear is that
if the present structure in the United States no longer is working
satisfactorily, a new structure needs to be considered.
III. HOW SHOULD GOALS BE BALANCED AND PRIORITIZED?
The last key issue, regardless of which goals are pursued and
which arm of government takes responsibility for each one, is
how to resolve conflicts among the goals. In the United States,

85
For a discussion of the constitutionality of a statutory bar to judicial review,
see Ralls Corp. v. CFIUS, 758 F.3d 296, 307–12 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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the answer to this question has emerged somewhat haphazardly,
with little occasion for policymakers to ponder whether it is being
done correctly.
Should one goal trump another? Should each goal be
balanced against the others? If different agencies with different
goals are involved, should each have a veto? If so, should there
be priorities among the vetoes? What about overriding vetoes—
should one arm of government have the right to override the veto
of another arm?
America has made its choices piecemeal. Every agency,
applying its own set of goals, potentially has a veto. But now
that advocates from both political parties have been calling on
antitrust enforcers to do more to advance the economy, one
reasonably can ask whether there are ways to improve upon the
status quo. As already described, there are several possibilities
for dividing or consolidating responsibility. But regardless of
whether multiple agencies continue to share responsibility for
reviewing business conduct or whether a single agency is tasked
with pursuing all the goals, there does seem to be a natural order
of priority worth considering.
National security, as that term is traditionally understood, is
the highest priority. No country is willing to allow foreign
interests to control the strategic assets essential to its defense.
National interest has become the next highest priority in
those countries that recognize the concept.
Although an
acquisition might not threaten a country’s defenses, it might
undermine its economic independence to an unacceptable extent.
If a transaction fails the national interest test, it will be rejected
regardless of whether it is neutral or beneficial in other respects.
After that, low prices and full employment are particular
priorities for most voters in the world’s democracies, including
the United States. The United States has treated low prices to
consumers as a higher priority than job creation in this context,
but plainly that presumption comes under increased pressure
when unemployment becomes a greater concern.
Dispersion of economic and political power is a growing
priority, especially as inequality and its political implications
attract increased attention. But until now, this has not been an
immediate priority, and jobs and prices have commanded greater
consideration. Has this changed?
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Preserving small business opportunities is an important
priority in America, but attracts attention from a narrower
constituency. Yet it remains important politically, and in certain
cases could assume as high a priority as low prices.
Concerns over the environment, government subsidies, and
minority cultures are of great importance in particular instances
but arise less often and have advocates in other parts of
government, relegating them to lower priority in most
competition discussions in the United States.
If America were to adopt a net benefit test for foreign
investment, could, and should, these goals be balanced against
one another? National security would trump all the others.
National interest would require a more nuanced analysis. In this
process, the nationality of the acquiring party or other party
under scrutiny could not be ignored. Is it from a hostile country?
Is it a state-owned entity? Is it a sovereign wealth fund? And
how many of the world’s largest multinational companies even
have national identities any more? What makes a company an
“American” company, or a “German” company, or a “Chinese”
company?
Consumer welfare traditionally would be a trump card as
well. When an antitrust agency wants to challenge a deal or a
practice because it is likely to result in higher prices, it usually is
dead on arrival, unless it turns out to be essential to national
security.
Harder than that would be balancing effects on employment,
concentration of power, protection of small business, government
subsidies, and so forth under a “net benefit” standard.
Sometimes the answer would be obvious but in most instances
there would be reasonable arguments on both sides. Those few
countries that have attempted to provide guidelines, such as
South Africa and Australia, recommend little more than stirring
all the considerations into a stew and judging whether the result
is palatable.
One response to this quandary is to simply conclude that
balancing is too hard to accomplish, and so should not be
undertaken at all. Another response is to conclude that if these
goals are not weighed against one another, too many undesirable
transactions and practices will be permitted, to the detriment of
the economy and the American public. If Canada, Australia, and
South Africa can prioritize to make hard decisions in order to
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protect their economies, why, one might ask, can’t the United
States?
Whether this reflects alarmism, protectionism, or
realism, interest is swelling and the time has arrived for a robust
debate.
CONCLUSION
Where does that leave us? We conclude where we began.
Critics have been complaining that there are too few jobs in
America and too much inequality. They have been calling for
broadening the goals of antitrust and, at the very least, for more
antitrust enforcement. More enforcement could be expected to
have an impact on the concentration of power and on jobs, but
even recalibrating the goals of antitrust law cannot, by itself,
realistically be considered a panacea for eliminating
unemployment or inequality overnight.
At the same time, other countries already have broader goals
written into their own laws, including their competition laws,
which protect jobs and limit foreign investment. These laws
create asymmetries that may be placing the United States at a
disadvantage. Today, America has the opportunity to expand the
goals of its laws to address these asymmetries, either through
broadening the interpretation of current legislation—which could
but need not include the antitrust laws—or by enacting new
laws. Such changes would present the challenge of deciding who
should apply these broader goals and how they should be
prioritized and balanced. If the antitrust agencies are not the
choice to assume this responsibility, an expanded CFIUS or a
newly constituted foreign investment review board would be
possible alternatives.
These changes could foster an
environment in which it would be easier for future trade
agreements to assure a level playing field for the United States
and its trading partners.
The devil is in the details, of course, and the devil would feel
right at home in this imbroglio. Broadening and strengthening
antitrust enforcement and foreign investment review sounds
simple enough but would raise a dizzying host of complications
and uncertainties. Yet, just because something is hard to
measure or hard to solve is no reason to ignore it. If loss of jobs
and concentration of power are threatening to harm the nation’s
economy and are not being adequately checked, changing nothing
would be an outcome but would not be a solution. Not all of the
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changes currently being proposed make equal sense, but for those
that make the most sense, the time for serious deliberation is
now.

